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“Whoever controls the media, controls the mind.”
(Unsourced) - James Douglas Morrison

Abstract
Our society revolves around communication. The Internet is the biggest, cheapest
and fastest digital communication channel used nowadays. Due to the continuous
increase of daily communication among people worldwide, more and more data
might be stolen, misused or tampered. We require to protect our communications
and data by achieving privacy and confidentiality.
Despite the two terms, “privacy” and “confidentiality”, are often used as syn-
onymous, in cryptography they are modelled in very different ways. Intuitively,
cryptography can be seen as a tool-box in which every scheme, protocol or prim-
itive is a tool that can be used to solve specific problems and provide specific
communication security guarantees such as confidentiality. Privacy is instead
not easy to describe and capture since it often depends on “which” information
is available, “how” are these data used and/or “who” has access to our data.
This licentiate thesis raises research questions and proposes solutions related to:
the possibility of defining encryption schemes that provide both strong secu-
rity and privacy guarantees; the importance of designing cryptographic protocols
that are compliant with real-life privacy-laws or regulations; and the necessity of
defining a post-quantum mechanism to achieve the verifiability of randomness.
In more details, the thesis achievements are:
(a) defining a new class of encryption schemes, by weakening the correctness
property, that achieves Differential Privacy (DP), i.e., a mathematically
sound definition of privacy;
(b) formalizing a security model for a subset of articles in the European General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), designing and implementing a cryp-
tographic protocol based on the proposed GDPR-oriented security model,
and;
(c) proposing a methodology to compile a post-quantum interactive protocol
for proving the correct computation of a pseudorandom function into a
non-interactive one, yielding a post-quantum mechanism for verifiable ran-
domness.
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Cryptography, Confidentiality, Privacy, Differential Privacy, GDPR, Verifiable
Randomness
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From Caves to the Internet: Privacy and Cryptography
Who are you? Why do you hide in the
darkness and listen to my private thoughts?
Romeo and Juliet
William Shakespeare
We are more than animals. We are social animals [43] who need to communi-
cate, socialize and share our feelings, thoughts and ideas to others. Our commu-
nication methods evolved during our history and from primitive languages and
abstract-paintings, we now use “advanced” languages and complex technologies
that allow us to feel “closer” to other people that are not physically close to us.
Nowadays, our life is becoming more and more digital and the Internet is the
biggest channel we use to communicate by using e-mails, social networks, blogs,
instant messaging, video-calls and many others. Digital communication is cheap,
fast and practical for the standard user: sending an email to someone on the other
side of the world is just a matter of typing the words on a keyboard, clicking on
the “send” button and almost instantaneously the email is sent and received.
What does “digital” mean?
Whenever we write an email, our thoughts are translated into words, and the
words are typed into a keyboard which encode them into something easier to
transmit. For this reason, the digital-world is dominated by discrete and finite
sets of symbols, for example the alphabet in any latin-derived language. There
is a finite amount of symbols that are composed in order to create words of which
we, as humans, give a special meaning.
One of these finite alphabets is the binary-set with only the symbols 0 and 1.
Claude Shannon gave a name to the symbols in this set: the bits. By combin-
ing bits, we obtain bit-strings and with these, we can just encode our previous
latin-alphabet into bit-strings and share these 0s and 1s. It is possible to en-
code everything into a bit-string and facilitate its employment into technologies
since only two different symbols are transmitted and not, for example, 26 latin-
letters! For this and other reasons, the bit is the building block of Information
1
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Theory [73], the mathematical field that, briefly, studies how information is ex-
changed during communication. A more tangible physical result of information
theory is the computer as the “automatic bits machine” which is able to ma-
nipulate, communicate and use pieces of information encoded into bit-strings.
We love computers. They make our life easier and allow us to digitally com-
municate with anybody at any time. Research on computers is evolving into
new directions and one the most promising and breakthrough ideas is building a
quantum computer, based on quantum bits, or qubits. As the name sug-
gest, a quantum computer is still a computer but with something more. Quantum
computers are expected to offer the biggest performance boost in the history of
technology and break the computational limits of current computers. Even if
there is not yet any practical quantum computer, different quantum algorithms
are ready to be deployed having a strong impact in mathematics, cryptography
and many other fields. In particular, Shor’s [74] and Grover’s [40] algorithms
will make possible to break down the security of some well-known cryptographic
primitives used in our daily life in order to protect our bank accounts or emails.
The primitives that will remain secure even when a quantum computer will be
used, belong to what is called post-quantum cryptography.
Why should we care about security?
Everyone of us has at least one secret. Maybe it is our PIN code for the credit-
card, the password for the email account, our health condition or anything that
we do not want to share with too many people. Secrets are important in personal
relationships in the sense that if I want to share with a friend a small piece of
information that I want to keep secret, then, trust is needed. In other words, I
need confidentiality guarantees.
It might sometimes be implicit, but we are used to require privacy or confiden-
tiality when interacting with other people or computers. Is it practical to require
“secure communications” or to ask “keep it confidential!”?
But, what does it mean? What is privacy and confidentiality?
What does “secure communication” mean?
Historically, cryptography is a tool-set that allows us to protect our sensitive
information and communications [67]. Cryptography evolved around the concept
of confidentiality of a message and security of a communication channel. At
the basic level, confidentiality and security guarantee that only authorized people
can obtain the message and access its authentic contents. With a picturesque
metaphor, we can think of cryptography as locks and keys that can be used
to lock the chests that contain our gold coins. We know that a specific key
will open the chest and we will allow a friend to open the chest by providing
him/her the key. Therefore, confidentiality is the guarantee that the lock is
so well-made and designed that no pirate can open the locked chest or deduce
From Caves to the Internet: Privacy and Cryptography 3
the amount of coins in the chest without having access to the key. Nowadays,
cryptography is not made with chests, locks and keys. Cryptography is based
on mathematics, functions, bits and it is widely used on a daily basis for all the
sensitive digital communication we have such as managing our bank accounts,
browsing the Internet, storing our health test results, messaging with a friend or
in other scenarios not so obvious, e.g., in cars, public transportation, etc.
Cryptography has a pretty neat distinction between secret and public informa-
tion, so neat that a piece of information cannot be both secret and public at
the same time. This concept is quite old, tracing back to the ancient Greece.
Aristotle, a 4th-century B.C. philosopher and scientist, wrote a collection of
political-philosophical books titled “Πολιτικά” or “Politics”. In this collection,
Aristotle explained the need for every politician to a neat separation between the
public sphere called πόλις, or “polis”, related to the personal political-life, and a
personal sphere called οἶκος, or “oikos”, that contains the family-life.
Aristotle’s idea was the starting concept that developed into privacy. Since his
initial spheres’ distinction, the concept of privacy evolved in our society and
technology and it can be considered as a modern human invention. In 1890,
the journal Harvard Law Review contains a law review titled “The Right To Pri-
vacy” that expresses the need of laws that can protect the “right to be alone”. At
the time, letters were read by post-employees and/or phones were easily eaves-
dropped or wiretapped. The World Wars moved even further the necessity to
confidential military communication but governments started profiling, identify-
ing and threatening individual people. The mass surveillance phenomenon was
rising.
Society, as a whole, has managed to take a strong turn and today, we consider pri-
vacy as a form of a personal-right of an individual to selectively express, share
information or seclude themselves from the others. In other words, the right
of privacy is the human unconditional action of protecting and hiding chosen
information to other entities. This means that no one, without the personal
permission of an individual, can use, read, store or sell that information. One
of the biggest examples of legislative documents, on human’s privacy-rights, is
the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [18], focusing on the
right of any European citizen to maintain his/her privacy over the data he/she
generates.
Our digitalized society requires privacy, confidentiality and security.
Every day, our data are generated by our devices, such as our own digital fin-
gerprints, stored in big companies servers and used to generate better services,
advertising and help us in our daily life. Data are the fuel of our markets but
can be used against us. Information is the Power and the Weapon of our digital-
era. Our contemporary history shows us the personal damage that can be done
when bigger IT-companies, like Facebook [38], or governmental security agencies,
like the NSA [39], abuse their information-power. For this reason, societies start
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raising questions and the will of achieving the right to be safe intellectually and
to protect their own identity by asking:
Can we protect our data? How can we use cryptography to achieve privacy?
How is privacy related to confidentiality?
In this licentiate thesis, I address these questions and provide some concrete
cryptographic tools that can be deployed in real-life to protect our data.
1 Sketchy 3-Sets-Data Privacy Model
Confidentiality and privacy are similar concepts when considered into the Aris-
totle’s sphere distinction between private and public information and they are
commonly synonymous in our daily discussions with friends. They are indeed in-
terconnected however there are substantial differences. In order to explain how
privacy and cryptography differ, let us describe and explain a simplistic model
that represent our data and their properties.
Firstly, let us define an order < to compare different data and their “publicity”.
For example, let us consider the information x = “Carlo is a PhD student” and
y = “Carlo’s credit-card PIN is ′′′′′”. It is pretty clear that x is more public with
respect to y, therefore we can denote it with x < y. Even if sometimes it is easy
to decide how to order two pieces of information, it is required to state the axiom:
Informal Axiom 1. The order < is not-objective, in the sense that every
person has his/her own order.
The second step is to define three sets to distinguish three categories of data, or
levels of publicity:
• Confidential Data C is the set of information that we are not willing to
share with anybody because these are sensitive data that can easily hurt
us, in some sense. Some examples might be the PIN code of our credit-card
or the passwords of our e-mail account.
• Shared Data S is the set of information that is sensitive but we are willing
or we need to share for some reason. In this set we can find our personal
health-measurements shared with a family doctor, our home address, our
annual-income or similar data that will be shared with some specific
people/entity but we do not want to disclose that information to the whole
world.
• Public Data P is the set of information that is not sensitive and we do
not mind to share it with the whole world.
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Informal Corollary 1. Since the Informal Axiom 1 holds, the sets are differ-
ent for each person and the membership problem is ill-defined, i.e., given an
information x, deciding which set contains x is a non-objective problem.
In different words, the order < and the distinct sets C,S,P are different among
different people. We describe this non-objectiveness with the term personal
privacy-perception, i.e., the individual perception of publicity. For example,
Carlo might find that x = “my personal email address” is public information,
i.e., x ∈ P, while it might exist someone that thinks that it is just a piece of
information that can be shared, i.e., x ∈ S.
The last point of our construction is describing how data relate with respect to
other data. We define the inference/deduction of information as the process
that takes as input some set of data {xi}i∈I and outputs a new information
z, denoted as {xi}i∈I → z. In a nutshell, imagine that somebody knows that
x = “Carlo loves cooking” and y = “Carlo is Italian”, then she might infer that
z = “Carlo loves Italian restaurants”. In real-life, an advertising company will
“bet” on z and it will start advertising Italian restaurants to Carlo. This inferred-
concept is at the base of all the big advertising companies online.
Informal Axiom 2. Data are always dependent with respect to other data:
for every information z, there always exists a set of information {xi}i∈I that
infers about z, i.e., {xi}i∈I → z.
The “always dependency” axiom is strong and scary but it is exactly what
research in advertising, machine learning and other fields, is willing to achieve
in a close future. For example, let us imagine a future where an internet search
engine will be able to predict Carlo’s research query before he finishes typing
the query [41]. This can help Carlo in getting useful advertisements while he is
navigating the internet. On the other hand, suppose Carlo is addicted to thai-
food, if Carlo’s next predicted advertising describes “the cheapest thai-restaurant”
with extremely high probability, Carlo will never be able to beat his addiction.
Additionally, inferring new information might have bigger consequences: suppose
the input data {xi}i∈I are public data, we infer {xi}i∈I → z and the output z is
a shared or a confidential information. This is what we define either as a privacy
breach or a security breach. These two breaches differ only on when the breach
happens. If the breach happens during the communication phase of the data,
then it is a security breach. Otherwise, if it happens after the communication
is finished, then it is a privacy breach. We distinguish and define four different
types of breaches named direct privacy breach, indirect privacy breach,
security breach and fake news phenomenon. The entire 3-Sets-Data privacy
model is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The Sketchy 3-Sets-Data Privacy Model. The black arrow indicates the communi-
cation between Carlo and his friend. The red arrows indicate all the possible inferences that
are breaches: direct privacy breach from public to shared/private, indirect privacy breach from
publishing Carlo’s shared information with his friend, security breach from the communication
between Carlo and his friend, fake information from Carlo’s public data infer and publish a
wrong inference.
1.1 Direct Privacy Breach
The direct privacy is the property that someone finds hard to infer secret
information that he/she didn’t receive. Equivalently, whenever someone is able
to infer a less public datum from the ones we gave him/her, this is a direct
privacy breach.
When considering a direct privacy breach, we have to better understand how
it is possible to have this breach. Let us consider a database in which Carlo
has some sensitive information x. The database is not publicly available but
it is possible to perform queries in order to obtain statistical analysis on the
data-points contained, i.e., it is not possible to directly query x but it is allowed
to query some function f over some aggregation of sensitive data and obtain a
public evaluation f(x, · · · ). For example, Carlo is pretty cautious not to share
his birth-date with anybody. On the other hand, Carlo gave his birth-date in the
national census form. The government now offers a free-of-charge web-service in
which anyone can ask and get statistics over a population. It is therefore possible
to get the answer to the query “how many people are born every month” but it
is not possible to ask for “the month when Carlo was born”.
In 2006, Dwork et al. [22] presented the concept of Differential Privacy (DP) in
which even by cleverly querying the database, it is impossible to infer information
about x. For example, let us consider two queries with a specific difference that
leak information: the first query is “how many people are born every month”
while the second is “how many people are born every month except Carlo”. It
is easy to understand that Carlo’s birth-month will be the difference of the two
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queries. This is a consequence of the Informal Axiom 2, the “always dependence”
axiom, because Carlo’s information is always contained in some group, either as
the fact that Carlo is participating in a dataset by just sharing his information or
simply because it is easy to create groups in statistics, for example “counting
with respect to categories” as in “count the number of people born each
month”.
For this reason, a direct privacy breach can be a individual breach, if the data
used for the inference are just Carlo’s public data. Otherwise, if the data are
collected from statistics over groups in which Carlo is (or not) a member, then we
have a group breach. The direct privacy breach concept is depicted in Figure 2.
Group 1
Group 2
Private Data
Group 1
Statistic
Group breach
Public Data
Public Data
Group 2
Statistic
Public Data Private DataPrivate Data
USER
Individual breach
Figure 2: From Paper A: Individual and group privacy breaches.
To avoid this information leakage, Dwork et al. [22] proposed theDP framework
that starts by measuring the accuracy of the query f . In other terms, this
means that it is necessary to compute “how precisely the query f can allow some
differential static privacy breach” or, more empirically, compute all the possible
differences between the statistics over the database. The result is used to define
a random variable distribution and, whenever the database has to reply to the
query f , a noise value is sampled and summed to the query result. The final
result is a noisy output that makes impossible to infer information on a single
user’s sensitive data, even when multiple and similar queries are performed to
the database.
1.2 Indirect Privacy Breach
The indirect privacy is the property that someone will not be able to publish
our shared information that he/she has. Equivalently, if someone is malicious,
in the sense that he/she wants to hurt us, then a indirect privacy breach
happens whenever he/she publishes some shared secret that was not allowed to
share with third parties.
The indirect privacy notion is hard to formally define because it highly depends
on the trust given to the receiver of the data. Let us consider a specific scenario
common in our daily-life. This setting is depicted in Figure 3. Carlo, as a client,
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uploads his data to a database in a cloud-service and allows a service-provider
to compute some statistical functions on his data.
User query
data
answer
feedback
Database
Service
Providers
Figure 3: From Paper B: Setting: users send data to a database and enjoy some service.
Despite the pretty simple model, developing a protocol between the parties while
achieving indirect privacy, this is not trivial to solve especially with the European
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [18] in mind. The GDPR is the
new European collections of rules, procedures, rights and obligations that anyone
has to follow when handling data from any European citizen.
To give an example, Carlo uploads all of his workout run-sessions and allows a
fitness application called Strava [78]. Strava monitors Carlo’s data and provide
him some statistical analysis on his workout and suggestions on how to improve.
Apart from that, Strava also provides an interactive map in which Carlo can take
a look for his running paths from his GPS-data and the path that other runners
do but only if they have approved to publicly share their GPS-data with the rest
of the users of the application. Unluckily, the option in the Strava application
for “sharing the GPS-position of run-sessions” was set to true by default.
Therefore, people were sharing their private (and sensitve) information without
noticing it. The threats of online-sport social networks and the sensitivity of
publishing GPS-data were theoretically studied in 2014 [77] and, in the beginning
of 2018, it was possible to infer the life-style of a specific Strava user, i.e., an
American soldier running around his secret military base in Afghanistan [42].
Strava’s example demonstrates that handling data in a privacy-preserving way is
hard to describe via cryptographic protocols because the receiver do not under-
stand the level of confidentiality that other people give to data. This is the reason
why we need specific privacy-laws, such as the GDPR, to protect how other peo-
ple use the data we generate and, by changing focus from law to cryptography,
try to solve the question:
Is it possible to design privacy-preserving protocols that comply with some
privacy-policies, such as the European GDPR?
1.3 Security Breach
A security breach is indeed the leakage of confidentiality and it is therefore
connected to the cryptographic property of the crypto-primitives used in com-
munications. Let us consider, Carlo is willing to share his x0 = “secret lasagna
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receipt” with Elena. Simplistically, in order to share it, Carlo and Elena encrypt
their messages while communicating, e.g., the encryption of the secret receipt
is Enc(x0). Since communication is made over a public channel, every eaves-
dropper can collect all the ciphertexts {Enc(xi)}i∈I and, if it is possible to infer
{Enc(xi)}i∈I → x0, then we have a security breach.
Whenever a cryptographic primitive or protocol is not secure in a general sense,
it means that it is somehow possible to have a security breach. To avoid this
problem, one of the characteristics that an encryption scheme must have is that
it produces ciphertexts that look like chaotic messages without any connection to
the original plaintext. This “chaos” is indeed connected to the most important
concept in cryptography: randomness. Despite the concept of randomness is
easy to understand, when stated as “sample a random value in a set” or “flip
a fair-coin ”, designing a function that should have a random-like output is not
an easy task. In fact, in cryptography we always refer to pseudo-randomness
because “it looks random” but in fact “it is not random”. To be precise, such
functions with random-looking outputs are called PseudoRandom Functions
(PRF). It is therefore of extreme importance to always use proved-secure crypto-
graphic primitives, such as proved-pseudorandom PRFs, in order to avoid security
breaches.
Additionally, it might be of vital importance to prove the correct evaluation of
a function. Imagine that Carlo needs to prepare a vegan-pizza for one of his
friend, Elena, which means that Carlo has to use vegan-cheese. After cooking,
Elena will require some guarantees that Carlo’s pizza is indeed vegan. Therefore
Carlo, while preparing the pizza, will take some videos as proofs and show them
to Elena before eating. Elena will verify, by checking the pizza and the videos,
that the correct cheese was used.
This proof-idea can be extended to PRFs into the definition of Verifiable Ran-
dom Functions (VRFs) which are PRFs that evaluate on pseudo-random out-
put and provide an additional proof used to verify the output is a correct
computation of a PRF.
1.4 Fake News Phenomenon
A possible problem that can arise is that the deducted results might be incorrect
and it can be used in a malicious way by just publicly sharing these fake in-
formation which can be connected to a bigger phenomenon identifiable as fake
news phenomenon. Publishing fake information may lead to defamation, the
act of damaging another person’s reputation by publicly sharing wrong and/or
malicious data.
With the help of social-networks and better communications tools, the spread of
fake news increased year by year, making it hard to judge the sources of the news
and the correctness of information. Our own society is affected by fake news
since people changed their political ideas [3] or changed their memories about
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the past [72].
It is hard to state how cryptography can help solving the fake-news problem. The
only exception is whenever we think of re-designing the whole news-publishing
process. In a nutshell, if it is possible to use cryptography to, at least, guarantee
the correct handling of photographies by creating tamper-proof and certified
photo-cameras, then we might help journalists to provide a “proof of correctness”
that allow readers to verify the correct handling of pictures and prove that the
photos are indeed real and untampered.
The under submission paper “Strong Functional Signature” by myself, B. Liang
and A. Mitrokotsa, provides a cryptographic primitive that can be used to help
journalists to provide these proofs. Since it has not been published yet, it is not
included in this dissertation.
2 The Thesis’ Contributions
In this thesis, we focus on providing mechanisms that can be employed to combat
the different privacy and security breaches. Our goal is to provide new crypto-
graphic tools that help protecting our data and/or prove that cryptography can
be used to design more privacy-oriented primitives while maintaining their con-
fidentiality.
2.1 Direct Privacy Breach - Paper A
An encryption scheme has to be correct, in the sense that the decryption of a
ciphertext needs to be the original message. When compared to an encryption
scheme, a DP mechanism always replies with an almost-correct answer. For this
reason, Paper A replies to the following question:
Question A: A Differentially Private Encryption Scheme [11]
Is there a way to define/construct a differentially private
encryption scheme?
The differential privacy mechanism is different from an encryption algorithm
while both can be seen as frameworks. Paper A studies the relation between the
formal definitions of an encryption scheme and a differential private mechanism
and merges them into a single cryptographic primitive.
To achieve this, we relax the encryption scheme’s correctness property. This
means that the encryption scheme has to “wrongly decrypt” with some bounded
probability, i.e., the decryption of a ciphertext can return a wrong message m′
with some probability αm,m′ that depends on the original message m and the
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final wrong message m′. By knowing these probabilities for all the messages,
it is possible to prove that the “faulty” encryption scheme achieves differential
privacy.
Additionally, we abstract and prove that using these “faulty” encryption schemes
is equivalent of using a correct encryption scheme and a DP mechanism as two
separate frameworks.
As a final contribution, an implementation is provided as a proof-of-concept.
2.2 Indirect Privacy Breach - Paper B
The main goal of Paper B is to provide a model/scheme with an implementation
designed to provide privacy-guarantees with respect to privacy-policies/regulations,
such as the GDPR, that are not always fully described in mathematical formal-
ism. By considering the scenario of Figure 3, the paper answers the following
question:
Question B: HIKE: Walking the Privacy Trail [62]
Is it possible to design privacy-preserving protocols that comply
with some privacy-policies, such as the European GDPR?
We start by selecting some specific articles contained in the GDPR and describe
as formal cryptographic properties:
(a) data has to be encrypted when stored;
(b) the user decides to selectively allow third parties to access his/her data;
and
(c) the user can always delete his/her data from the database (right to be
forgotten).
In order to describe the “client, cloud and service provider” model, we use the
concept of labelled encryption scheme [4] in which every message, or ciphertext,
has a label that can be seen as a unique public identifier for that message. With
the labels and an algebraic “magic trick”, better described as associativity and
commutativity in a group, we are able to define some decryption token gen-
erated by the client. This allows a service provider to decrypt some specific
label-ciphertext. Finally, we exploit the additive homomorphic property in or-
der to allow homomorphic evaluations on the client’s ciphertexts. Additionally,
the client is able to generate a single token for a labelled-program, which is the
homomorphic function to evaluate with a list of labels that are the inputs to the
function.
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Since the function to evaluate is seen by the clients, the clients can refuse to
provide the decryption token and therefore not-disclose their data.
More concretely, we start from the ElGamal encryption scheme [25], we describe
the scheme as a labelled encryption scheme called LEEG, expand it with some
specific features regarding the decryption token into FEET and finally obtaining
the HIKE protocol, depicted in Figure 4, that is then proven secure in the GDPR-
oriented security model we defined.
As a final contribution, all our ideas are implemented and our code for the HIKE
protocol is publicly available at https://github.com/Pica4x6/HIKE.
Client Server
Service Providers
Dec(skC,P, ct) → m
Enc(skC, ℓ,m) → ct UploadData(∆, ℓ, ct) → ∆
upload
forget
retrieve
token
retrieve
Destroy(skC,P) → tok
Eval(f, ℓ1, ..., ℓn) → ct
TokenDec(skP, ct, tok) → mTokenGen(skC,P) → tok
Figure 4: From Paper B: The HIKE protocol.
2.3 Security Breach - Paper C
We start by considering the general problem of achieving a post-quantum version
of every cryptographic primitive. We focus on verifiable random functions and in
particular on simulatable VRFs (sVRFs). In a nutshell, sVRFs are a family of
VRFs in a public parameter security model, such as the common reference string.
Paper C provides some directions in order to address the following question:
Question C: Lattice sVRF: Challenges and Future Directions [12]
Is it possible to define a post-quantum sVRF?
We proposed the possibility of defining a lattice-based membership-hard
with efficient sampling language which can be used to define a lattice-based
dual-mode commitment scheme. We partially conjecture the possibility to com-
bine the dual-mode commitment scheme with Libert et al.’s protocol [52] and
Lindell’s transformation [54] and obtain an sVRF under post-quantum assump-
tions.
Given the non-triviality of the task, we raise and identify different open challenges
in lattice-based cryptography and possible future directions for achieving a post-
quantum sVRF.
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